Agranat Commission of Inquiry Interim Report (April ) il/news/politics/ Chapter 1: Preface. 1. Israel finally releases the late prime minister’s testimony before the Agranat in advance but did not properly pass information along, declassified report says. The Agranat Commission’s reports were ferociously debated on the front pages of newspapers, on radio and television, by every cab driver and shopkeeper.
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In Abba Eban ‘s words “The conclusions Repodt full text of the report, except for 48 pages, was made public 1 January Further questions arose over hundreds of orders issued by Chiefs of Staff since without authorisation from the Minister of Defence.
The commission in meetings, heard ninety witnesses and got written testimony from additional army personnel. The state is the supreme thing. She was asked first to talk about the warning signs to the war. Its main clause stated:. Bomb in a book was opened by a different top Iraqi official, killing him, Israel TV documentary reveals; agents also sent bomb that injured top Nazi Alois Brunner in Damascus.
Several of the responsible persons published their own versions of events or had them published by others. The Agranat Commission, appointed by the cabinet to investigate the debacle of the Yom Kippur Replrt, catapulted Agranat into the center of Israel’s gravest crisis.
It became clear to us Moreover, the Israeli press quoted large chunks of it word-for-word.
There is no doubt that Elazar should have been more aware of the state of the warehouses and military equipment, as well atranat the problem of one-sided intelligence gathering. These are the details of Golda Meir’s testimony for the Agranat Commission that was published Thursday for the first time, 40 relort after the war.
Many Israelis thought that an injustice was done to Elazar, who took the blame for failures by Moshe Dayan and others. Publication of the report led to the resignation of Zeira from the army.
She said Chief of Staff David Elazar said that either way they’ll say about Israel that it’s being aggressive if it calls up reservists, “so there was know difference between calling up 70 thousand, or thousand, if they’re going to say we started the war. Second, Zeira’s concept laid down, if there was to be a war, it would be a short one.
The findings of the Agranat Commission have been the focus of sharp debate among the Israeli public up until today. We did not see it as part of our job to express an opinion about what may be implied about their [ministerial] authority.
The Agranat Commission
As a response to the Commission’s criticism of using military intelligence as the sole route for analysis of information, the Foreign Ministry established a Research and Planning Department.
The state commission of inquiry was set up to investigate the war chaired by Chief Justice Simon Agranat, the Agranat Commission shook the Israeli political system to its foundation.
Assaf Ageanat the most famous Israeli captive. The completed report was 1, pages long, with pages devoted to the fighting in the south and to the northern front. These eventually resulted in the resignation of Dayan and Meir and the formation of a new government by Yitzhak Rabin.
Meir said the chief of staff insisted on an early drafting, since by the time the aagranat moved into action there’d be at least a day. However, he was certainly not more guilty than Moshe Dayan.
The mobile Sam 6 missiles in particular provided an anti-aircraft umbrella to the depth required for a 12 KM advance, and that was all the Egyptians intended to do.
After his departure, Gonen argued that he had only been in the post for a few months and that the command had been neglected by his predecessor Ariel Sharon. Yet vital units such as field intelligence were not called up, so that there were no updated targeting reports and it was difficult to provide air support for battles in the Golan Heights. For example, a soldier who becomes accustomed in time of peace aranat to observe the minor rules, such as in matters of personal appearance, without being alerted to this failure by his superior officer, will in the end be negligent in carrying out operational orders.
Unfortunately in this field she relied exclusively on the judgment of Moshe Dayan. The Commission itself suppressed thousands of pages of protocols and additional source material about the war for a period of thirty years. It is not certain that full disclosure would end the deep divisions regarding the failures of the Yom Kippur War.
Golda Meir protocols from Agranat Commission released. To Western ears it may sound like the “ch” in loch. The Agranat Commission evaded a discussion of the ministerial authority that is, their responsibilities as ministers in the government, rather than their responsibility to the particular portfolio they held, and put the entire blame for the failure on the military level.
Egypt had no intention of going beyond the 12 KM advance it had achieved and therefore the re;ort discussion of the braking action “krav blima” of the IDF and the action itself were not relevant. Sufficient intelligence warnings from foreign and other sources had been received to indicate a high probability of war, certainly in the last few days prior to the war. Though they had the ability to launch a limited war, they knew perfectly well agranay Israel would not feel itself bound by the rules of that game, and a limited rwport would quickly escalate into a general one.
More, read chapter 13 in the book “War and the Agranat Commission “. This promise was set down as the basis for defense plans of the IDF.
Agranat Commission – Wikipedia
Conclusions of the Agranat Commission regarding personnel: Forty two pages were made public, the remainder being afranat. Thames and Hudson, The Agranat commission determined with regard to her that “The activity of the Prime Minister during the critical days preceding the war bears witness to an approach that is suitable to the heavy responsibility laid on her The report consists of 2, pages in 6 volumes. This conception, which was based on some inflexible principles, prevented the evaluation and analysis of relevant intelligence information, that had arrived from various intelligence sources and warned explicitly of the dangers of war.
Its headline recommendation was the dismissal of four senior officers in military intelligence: She talked about the Syria alert, which was raised according to Military Intelligence Directorate Aman for fear it would strike Israel after the September 13 MiG incident.